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I. INTRODUCTIOND URING the past decade there has been a great increase in
the number of product liability lawsuits involving sophisti-
cated forensic engineering. For example, the scanning electron
microscope, which became commercially available as a research
instrument only several years ago, is now routinely used to analyze
failed parts and trace amounts of foreign substances in accident
investigations, and it often forms the basis of expert testimony in
the courtroom. As the experimental and analytical techniques for
investigating failures and accidents have become both more num-
erous and more sophisticated, the engineering issues being raised in
these cases have also become more complex. An engineer is no
longer simply asked to testify whether a part contains a well-
defined design or manufacturing defect. With increasing frequency,
he is asked whether an ill-defined defect, in a poorly photographed
part lost two years before he was retained by an attorney, was
responsible for a failure that led to an accident. The most sophisti-
cated equipment available is of no use if there is no failed part to
examine; in such circumstances, any opinion about cause of failure
must be based on analysis rather than on observation of hard
evidence.
* Dr. Tetelman is Professor of Engineering at UCLA and is President of Fail-
ure Analysis Associates, Palo Alto, Calif. B. Engr. (1958), M. Engr. (1960),
D. Engr. (1961), Yale University.
** Mr. Burack is a member of the Bars of California and the District of Co-
lumbia and is practicing with a Washington, D.C. firm. B.A. (1964), Wesleyan
University; M.S. (1967), J.D. (1970), Stanford University.
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Simple logical analysis will often indicate more than one possible
cause of an accident-for example, operator error, failure of a
part due to either an inherent defect or environmental factors, or
some other unanticipated circumstance. But in litigation, as in
other contexts, it is often neither satisfying nor sufficient to de-
termine possible causes; what must be determined is the actual, or
at least probable, cause. Without a part to examine, this determina-
tion may often be difficult or impossible. Even in such situations,
however, the concepts of a recently developed methodology called
"risk analysis" can sometimes be used to determine the most likely
cause of the accident.
The aim of this article is to illustrate how risk analysis concepts
and methods can be used in accident litigation. The article begins
by discussing the basic concepts of risk analysis, and particularly
the two elements fundamental to any notion of risk-frequency
and severity. It then discusses ways in which levels of risk can be
meaningfully measured and compared, and in particular focuses on
what constitutes an "unacceptable" level of risk. Next, two illustra-
tions are given of the application of risk analysis methodology in
litigation contexts. In the first case,' an agency of the United States
Government had brought a civil action against an automobile
manufacturer in an effort to compel the manufacturer to recall
certain vehicles on the ground that they contained a defect which
posed an "unreasonable risk" of accident, injury, or death. A risk
analysis study was performed and received in evidence; the study
concluded that the level of risk was negligible. The trial judge sub-
sequently found, on the basis of all the evidence, that no "un-
reasonable risk" was shown to have been present. The second case
(which was ultimately settled and is therefore unreported) was a
product liability action arising out of the crash of a helicopter
following the corrosion failure of a control tube. The central issue
was whether the corrosion failure was caused by defective manu-
facture or by improper maintenance on the part of the helicopter's
owners. This article considers how risk analysis concepts were used
I United States v. General Motors Corp., Civil Nos. 74-277 and 74-1053
(D.D.C., April 28, 1975). The authors participated in the case as expert witness
for the defendant and counsel for the defendant, respectively. Various aspects of
the proceedings are described later in this article. (See especially § III.A infra.)
An appeal is currently pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit (Civil Nos. 75-1751, 75-1752).
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in deposition testimony to show that, in all likelihood, there was
no defect in the control tube. Finally, after these two illustrations,
the article reviews some tactical and procedural considerations sur-
rounding the use of risk analysis testimony.
II. THE BASIC CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY OF RISK ANALYSIS
We all encounter the notion of "risk" in our daily lives. When we
decide not to do something because it is too risky for our taster--
for example, when we decide not to speed while driving through
fog or decide not to go sky-diving-we determine, either explicitly
or implicitly, that the risks inherent in the activity outweigh the
activity's benefits. We make a contrary determination, finding bene-
fits to outweigh risks, when we decide to speed in order not to be
late in reaching a distant destination, decide to travel with spouse
and children in one airplane rather than split the family up, or
decide to go scuba diving.
In making such determinations, we must obviously have some
intuitive notion of what constitutes "risk."' Nevertheless, the notion
of "risk" is difficult to quantify or to pin down with precision. Risk
analysis attempts to accomplish this difficult task.
A. The Meaning of "Risk": Frequency and Severity
The "risk" associated with an event has two basic elements-
the frequency with which the event occurs (e.g., the number of
accidents of a particular type per year) and the severity of the
consequences if it occurs (e.g., the number of deaths, injuries, lost
working days, down time, or repair and replacement costs for both
personnel and equipment). Both elements are essential, as a few
simple illustrations will make clear. Consider two types of events,
A and B: If A and B are known to occur with exactly the same
frequency (i.e., to be equally probable) but the consequences of
event A (if it occurs) are more severe than those of event B (if it
occurs), then the risk associated with A is greater than the risk
I Risk is generally regarded as something to which people have an aversion;
people would prefer to have less rather than more risk associated with any ac-
tivity, all other things being equal. Risk aversion is not always characteristic of
our behavior, however. For example, in such activities as sky-diving, automobile
racing, mountain climbing or motorcycling the element of risk is itself one of the
factors that appears to make the activity attractive to many people.
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associated with B.' If the severity of event A (if it occurs) is exactly
the same as the severity of event B (if it occurs) but A occurs
more frequently than B, then the risk associated with A is again
greater than that associated with B." Obviously, if A both occurs
more frequently and also has more severe consequences than B,
then A once again is the riskier activity.'
The fundamental notion that the risk associated with an event
is a function of both the event's frequency and its severity is intui-
tively reasonable; that notion seems in keeping with the judgments
we make as individuals, as well as the broader judgments society
makes.! This notion of risk also reflects modem concepts of reli-
ability engineering. To the reliability engineer, there is no such
thing as a perfectly safe product; for every product there is a non-
zero probability of failure (small, perhaps, but still non-zero) and
a non-zero probability that such a failure will result in injury
to somebody (not severe, perhaps, but still an injury).' In order to
IAs an example of this situation, suppose event B is the crash of a 100-
passenger commercial aircraft and A is the crash of a 400-passenger commercial
aircraft. Assuming each to be equally probable, it seems intuitively clear that, in
any meaningful sense, the latter event involves the greater hazard.
4 Thus, suppose event A is the crash of one kind of 100-passenger commercial
aircraft and event B is the crash of another kind of 100-passenger commercial
aircraft. If A occurs more frequently than B, the risk associated with A is ob-
viously greater than the risk associated with B.
5 The situation is more complicated if A occurs more frequently than B but
B (when it occurs) is more severe than A (when it occurs). Here, A may or may
not be riskier than B, depending upon precisely how risk is perceived or defined.
For example, if risk is defined as the product of frequency times severity (R =
f x S), then A is riskier than B if, but only if, the product is greater for A than
for B. As will be discussed below, this product is essentially how risk is quantified
by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. See text following note 17 infra.
" For example, society seems willing to tolerate a relatively high accident rate
in general (i.e., noncommercial) aviation, when an individual accident is likely
to injure or kill only a few persons. By contrast, society insists on a much lower
accident rate for commercial aviation, where each accident is likely to take a
much larger toll. See Starr, Social Benefit versus Technological Risk, 165 SCIENCE
1232, 1236 (1969); Lave, Risk, Safety and the Role of Government, NAT'L
ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, PERSPECTIVES ON BENEFIT-RISK DECISION MAKING 96,
99-102 (1972).
The law of negligence also recognizes that the quantum of risk present in a
particular situation is a function of both the probability (frequency) and severity
of an accident occurring in that situation. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS, 149-51 (3d ed. 1964).
Handler has stated that:
Water, air, food, drugs, automobiles, bathtubs, aircraft and power
plants never can be associated with zero risk; zero risk can be
achieved only by zero exposure.
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make a product safer, the engineer can decrease the frequency
(i.e., the probability) of failure and of the resulting injuries, or he
can decrease the severity of such injuries, or he can do both. For
example, in order to decrease the risk associated with loss-of-brake
failures in automobiles, an automotive safety engineer could install
a redundant braking system, thus decreasing the probability of loss
of brakes. Alternatively, he could install padding or restraints
(e.g., seat belts) to be absorb energy during the crash, so that a
smaller fraction of the impact energy would be transmitted to the
occupants, thus making less severe the consequences of any collision
that should occur.'
There is an inverse relationship between the frequency and
severity of accidents of a given type: The more severe the accident,
the less frequently it will occur. This inverse relationship-which is
the fundamental "law" of risk analysis-has an extremely broad
range and applies to accidents of all kinds: minor aircraft acci-
dents are more frequent than major catastrophes; dented fenders
occur more frequently than disastrous chain-collisions on the high-
ways; and while streams may overflow their banks fairly frequently,
severe floods are comparatively rare.
B. Estimation of the Level of Risk
Recognizing that the two essential elements of risk are frequency
Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Scientific Base for Government Regulation,
43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 808, 809 (1975). Dr. Handler is the President of the
National Academy of Sciences, and his article appeared as a response to Green,
The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 791
(1975). For an equivalent statement by a reliability engineer, see Ang, Structural
Risk Analysis and Reliability-Based Design, 99 J. OF THE STRUCTURAL DIVISION,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CIVIL ENGINEERS 1891 (Sept. 1973).
Either course will involve some additional expense-in initial cost because
of the additional system and material, and in lifetime cost because of decreased
performance resulting from increased weight. If these additional costs are suffi-
ciently large and the decrement in risk is sufficiently small, the decision will be
made not to reduce the level of risk any further. That is, it will be decided that
the system is already "safe enough." For an analysis of this situation see Lave
& Weber, A Benefit-Cost Analysis of Auto Safety Features, 2 APPLIED ECONOMICS
265 (1970). (There is a sizeable amount of literature dealing with the role of
costs in risk-benefit decisionmaking. This subject is, however, beyond the scope
of this article.)
In fact, the United States Government has determined that the measures de-
scribed in the accompanying text for the reduction in frequency and severity
should all be adopted. Federal motor vehicle safety standards require cars to con-
tain padding, restraints and redundant braking systems. See 49 C.F.R. §5
571.105-75, 571.201, 571.209 (1975).
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and severity, the question then becomes how to combine those
elements in order to estimate quantitatively the level of risk as-
sociated with various types of occurrences. At the outset, of
course, one must be able to assign values in a meaningful manner
to the frequency and severity of a particular kind of event. After
that, the frequency and severity values must be combined in a way
that permits the estimated risk levels associated with different kinds
of events to be meaningfully compared with one another. While
these things can (in theory at least) be done in several ways, this
article will focus on the method used by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission.
In the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1972,' Congress found
that "an unreasonable number of consumer products which present
unreasonable risks of injury are distributed in commerce;"0 and,
"the public should be protected against unreasonable risks of injury
associated with consumer products ... ."" In order to provide such
protection"2 and "to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative
safety of consumer products,"'3 Congress established the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and authorized it, among
other things, to
maintain an Injury Information Clearinghouse to collect, investi-
gate, analyze, and disseminate injury data, and information, re-
lating to the causes and prevention of death, injury, and illness
associated with consumer products ...."
Under this authority the CPSC operates the National Electronic
Injury Surveillance System (NEISS), an accident reporting system
designed to develop statistically valid, nationally representative
accident injury data which can be used to identify product safety
problems.'" As shown in Table 1, the CPSC estimates the severity
Pub. L. No. 92-573, 86 Stat. 1207, codified at 15 U.S.C. 5§ 2051 et seq.
(1972).







"NEISS connects the emergency rooms in 119 hospitals across the country
to a computer data bank maintained by the CPSC. Whenever an injury resulting
from a consumer product is brought into one of the surveyed emergency rooms,
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of each injury reported by NEISS by assigning to it a number rep-
resenting its severity value in accordance with the seriousness of
the diagnosis."6
TABLE I
CPSC - NEISS VALUES FOR ACCIDENT SEVERITY CATEGORIES
Severity Representative Diagnosis Severity
Category Value
0 = Incomplete or otherwise not acceptable data 0
1 = Mild injuries/small areas, dermatitis and sprains 10
2 = Punctures-fractures 12
3 = Contusions-scalds 17
4 = Internal organ injury 31
5 = Contusions-cell and nerve damage 81
6 = Amputations-crushing and anoxia 340
7 = All hospitalized category sixes 2,516
8 = All deaths 34,721
The CPSC then calculates, on an annual basis, the risk associated
with various consumer products. For each product, the severity
values for accidents reported during the year are averaged, yielding
an estimated "average annual severity" (S) for that product for
that year. For each product a projection is also made, based upon
the number of injuries reported by the NEISS system, of the total
number of injuries treated in all of the nation's emergency rooms
involving that product during the year." This number (f) is the
estimated "annual frequency" of such occurrences. The CPSC then
computes an annual "frequency-severity index" (I), which is a
measure of the risk associated with the product, by multiplying the
estimated annual frequency by the average annual severity:
I=fXS.
a report of the incident-including an identification of the product involved and
a description of the injury-is transmitted to the data bank.
For a more complete description of NEISS and the way it operates see W.
KIMBLE, FEDERAL CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT S 73 (1975). A monthly
publication of the CPSC called NEISS NEWS also describes the system's operation.
11 The CPSC has recently modified, in certain respects, the table of severity
values and the manner in which the values are used in calculations. See NEISS
NEWS, July 1975, at 3. The earlier values, contained in Table 1, are shown in this
paper because they were the values used in performing the risk analysis described
in Section III.A infra.
1" Because of the manner in which they are collected, the NEISS data indicated
that a product was involved in an injury-producing event, but not necessarily that
the product itself caused the injury. See NEISS NEWS, January 1973, at 2.
1976]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
The larger I is, the greater the risk associated with the particular
consumer product, and vice versa. Thus, the frequency-severity
index (I) "shows the magnitude of the injury problem associated
with a product relative to that associated with other products.""8
The CPSC method computes the risk (that is, the frequency-
severity index) on a purely annual basis, rather than on a per-
hour-of-usage basis. This may occasionally present difficulties in
comparing the levels of risk associated with different consumer
products, since some products, (e.g., beds and tables) are used
much more during the year than others (e.g., space heaters or
propane camping stoves). Because most products pose a risk of
injury only when they are being used, the purely annual calculation
performed by the CPSC tends to overstate the relative risk of
products that are used frequently during the year and to under-
state the relative risk of those that are seldom used. This difficulty
can be avoided, however, by recalculating the frequency values
associated with particular kinds of products to account for their
differing usage rates. For example, rather than using as the
"frequency" the absolute number of estimated injuries per year
due to a particular product, one could use the number of estimated
injuries per hour (or per 1000 hours) of usage, as measured over
the course of a year. By doing this for all products, more meaning-
ful comparisons can be made among the resulting risk values
(hazard indices) of products with widely different usages; the
comparisons are more meaningful because the consumer, looking
at such figures, can tell precisely how much more likely he is to
suffer injury during an hour's use of one product than during an
hour's use of another."9
Such recalculation should not be necessary, however, in an im-
18 NEISS NEWS, January 1973, at 3. The CPSC uses these calculational meth-
ods as a "management tool" in setting priorities for its own further studies. In
doing this, the CPSC focuses not on the "frequency-severity index" for a given
product, but rather on the "mean severity" of the injuries associated with the
product. Id. See also NEISS NEWS, July 1975, at 3, 12.
For a discussion, by an author not associated with the CPSC, of a similar ap-
proach to the evaluation and comparison of risks, see Fine, Mathematical Evalua-
tion for Controlling Hazards, 3 J. SAFETY RESEARCH 157 (1971).
9 The engineer generally uses the term "normalization" to describe this process
of calculating an index over a time period or over a population in such a way as
to make the result more meaningful and self-consistent. Thus, the text discussed
"normalizing the risk to exposure time."
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portant class of cases-those which involve failures in components
or subsystems of larger systems. In such cases, the usages or ex-
posure times associated with the components of the subsystems are
the same as the exposure time associated with the entire system.
For this reason, the risks associated with such components or
subsystems can meaningfully be compared without worrying about
recalculating the risk on a per-hour-of-exposure basis. For example,
the risks associated with various subsystems of an aircraft-say,
the engines, the navigational system or the cabin pressurization
system-can all be calculated on a purely annual basis using the
CPSC method and then meaningfully compared with one another,
since the usage of each subsystem is about the same (equal to the
usage of the aircraft). The same would be true of subsystems of,
say, an automobile.
C. The Meaning of "Acceptable" Risk
The CPSC method provides a way to quantify the level of risk
associated with a given item and to compare these levels for different
items. It may also be used to provide an answer to the question,
whether a particular level of risk is so small as to be clearly "reason-
able" or "acceptable."
It is obvious that society does consider some risks to be "accept-
able" since people incur many risks voluntarily and without any
apparent reluctance. For example, although we are all bombarded
by natural radiation every day-from cosmic rays, as well as from
radioactive materials in the ground, water, buildings and air
around us' 0-we do not attempt to avoid it; indeed, many people
voluntarily accept considerably higher levels of radiation exposure
by getting frequent medical and dental x-rays, by living at high
altitudes, or by traveling by jet frequently. 1 Similarly, although
20 See Muller, Natural Radiation Background vs. Radiation From Nuclear
Power Plants, J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES, July-August 1972, at 9.
Of course, many people are not aware of the presence of background radia-
tion, and thus do not perceive the real (although small) risk associated with it.
In other situations, people may act as though a substantial risk is present, even
though the activity in question is a fairly safe one. The relationship between per-
ceived risk and real risk is beyond the scope of this paper.
21 Cosmic radiation is to a large extent dependent on altitude. In the mid-
altitudes, the cosmic radiation varies from about fifty millirem per year at sea
level to about 3800 millirem per year at altitudes where jet aircraft fly (35,000
feet). Thus, assuming that commercial jet airliner crews are airborne sixty hours
a month, their occupational radiation exposure due to cosmic radiation alone will
19761
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driving generally poses a relatively high level of risk of injury or
death, the large majority of Americans voluntarily accept that risk
by continuing to drive."
The fact that people accept many naturally occurring risks sug-
gests a possible criterion for determining when the risk posed by a
product of technology is "acceptable". Such a risk may be con-
sidered "acceptable" when its magnitude is comparable to or
smaller than naturally occurring risks that society appears willing
to accept. For example, available data appear to indicate that the
risk of fatalities posed by such widespread activities as driving and
flying on commercial aircraft is about equal to the risk of fatalities
caused by disease and old age;" and, on the whole, society regards
these activities as not involving unreasonably high risks. By contrast,
general (i.e., private) aviation, which is not yet as widely accepted
by society as commercial aviation, poses a risk of death about
thirty times greater than the risk of death due to disease."
This method for determining when a risk is small enough to be
"acceptable" is not likely to be useful in litigation contexts. Sys-
tematic data dealing with naturally occurring levels of risk are
often not available, and even when available, they may be either
scanty or of questionable reliability. Moreover, the basic premise
be in the range of 300 millirem per year. Even one transcontinental roundtrip per
year will give the businessman or vacationer about four millirem. And the average
sea-level cosmic radiation exposure of fifty millirem per year increases to about
150 millirem per year for some mile-high locations such as Denver.
22 For discussions of the level of risk associated with automobiles and society's
apparent acceptance of that risk see Starr, supra note 6; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA-
TORY COMM'N, REACTOR SAFETY STUDY: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCIDENT RISKS IN
U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (1975), Main Report at 9-19 [here-
inafter cited as RASMUSSEN REPORT].
2 See Starr, supra note 6; Starr, Cost-Benefit Studies in Sociotechnical Sys-
tems, NAT'L ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, PERSPECTIVES ON BENEFIT-RISK DECISION
MAKING 17 (1972).
24 One author has noted that many activities, such as driving, begin as sporting
endeavors involving only a small fraction of the population. As the number of
participants increases and the activity becomes both more accessible and useful to
society, its risk level decreases down to the acceptable disease level. This probably
results from the fact that more conservative operators are using the equipment,
and they are willing to trade off performance and thrills for reliability, safety,
and higher cost. On this basis, we might expect that the risk associated with gen-
eral aviation will decrease over the next decade as the state-of-the-art of opera-
tion, maintenance and manufacture are improved, and as a large population par-
ticipates in the activity. See Starr, Cost-Benefit Studies in Sociotechnical Systems,
NAT'L ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, PERSPECTIVES ON BENEFIT-RISK DECISION MAK-
ING 17, 32-37 (1972).
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of the method-that the level of risk associated with such naturally
occurring events as disease constitutes a threshold of acceptability
somehow recognized (though perhaps tacitly) by society-is still
more of an hypothesis than a proven fact.'"
There is, however, another method that can, in an important
class of cases, be used to assess whether the risk associated with a
particular kind of event is "acceptable." Suppose we are studying
a system-say, an airplane or an automobile-with a particular
part or component P, and we wish to determine whether the risk
associated with a defect in part P is acceptable. Suppose further
that the system has numerous parts and components besides part P,
and that people customarily use comparable systems-comparable
airplanes or automobiles-and accept the overall level of risk as a
whole. Inherent in the overall level of risk is some degree of
natural variability, reflecting the fact that accidents can never be
prevented entirely" and their frequency and consequences can
never be predicted with certainty. Different severity values will be
associated with different accidents resulting from a given product,
and the frequency of accidents will not be perfectly uniform; thus,
there will always be some scatter in the overall risk about an
average value. In such a situation, the level of risk associated with
a defect in part P may be considered to be "acceptable" when that
level of risk is not only smaller in magnitude than the average level
of risk associated with the system as a whole, but is also as small
as or smaller than the variations in the overall level of risk.
This method of determining what constitutes an "acceptable" risk
seems intuitively reasonable. In voluntarily using the entire system
people unavoidably encounter and accept an average overall level
of risk with an inherent variability. For instance, although there
is an average level of risk associated with driving during the course
of a year, the precise level of risk varies from time to time depending
on many factors, such as weather, road conditions, local population
density, and whether it is a holiday weekend. If the risk associated
with a defect in part P (a particular automotive component for
2 People often appear to find the levels of risk associated with natural occur-
rences to be too high and act to lower the levels of risk. Thus, people use light-
ning rods on their homes, and they have themselves and their families immunized
against many common diseases.
' See note 7 supra.
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instance) is about the same as or smaller than the unavoidable
variations in the overall system risk, the risk associated with part P
will look to the user of the system exactly like one of the unavoid-
able fluctuations in the overall risk. Since the user is willing to
accept the overall risk together with its inherent variability, he
should also be willing to accept the risk associated with the defect
in part P.
27
This concept of "acceptable" risk has the advantage of covering
a class of commonly occurring situations-those involving failures
of a component in a complex system. The time during which
people are exposed to risks associated with the component will
generally be the same as the time during which they are exposed
to risks associated with the entire system. Thus, as noted above,2'
comparisons between the risk associated with the part and the
overall system risk can be made simply, and without concern for
whether the risks being compared have been estimated using
comparable exposure or usage times.
III. THE USE OF RISK ANALYSIS IN ACCIDENT LITIGATION
The preceding sections discussed the fundamental concepts of
risk, frequency, and severity; demonstrated how estimations can
be made of the levels of risk associated with various activities; and
discussed a method by which to determine, in a fairly straight-
forward manner, whether certain risks are so small as to be
"acceptable." This section will illustrate how the ideas previously
discussed in the abstract can be used in litigation involving failures
of components.
A. Risk Analysis As It Was Used in an Automotive Defect Case
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as
amended, ("the Safety Act") 2' empowers the Administrator of the
2 Put slightly differently, it will not make sense for the user to spend any
significant sum of money to repair part P, since the result will not significantly
affect the overall risk faced by the user and since the other inherent variations
in the overall risk will, in any event, essentially mask the result of the repair.
2" See text accompanying note 19 supra.
2980 Stat. 718, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (1972). The Safety Act
was amended on October 27, 1974, by the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety
Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1470. Those Amendments did not apply to the
case discussed in this section; in any event, they did not change the Act in any
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to
direct an automobile manufacturer to notify owners of certain ve-
hicles that the vehicles contain a defect which "relates to motor
vehicle safety."' Such directives are not self-enforcing; in order to
compel the manufacturer to comply, the government must prove
by the preponderance of the evidence at a trial de novo (i) that
the vehicles contain a defect, and (ii) that the defect "relates to
motor vehicle safety" within the meaning of the Act.'1 The Act
defines "motor vehicle safety" as the absence of an "unreasonable
risk" of accidents, injuries or deaths." Thus the question may
arise in such enforcement actions whether a particular defect in a
particular motor vehicle poses an "unreasonable risk" of accidents,
injuries or deaths.
The question squarely arose in a recent suit participated in by
the authors of this article.' The government brought an enforce-
ment action seeking to compel an automobile manufacturer to
notify owners of certain vehicles that the "pitman arms" of the
vehicles contained a defect "related to motor vehicle safety." The
pitman arm is a non-redundant component of the steering system,
the failure of which results in total loss of steering control. The
government contended that the pitman arms were prone to failure
by fatigue fracture, and because such failure entailed loss of steering
control, the pitman arms necessarily posed an "unreasonable risk."
In essence, the government's position was that loss of steering posed
a risk of possible accidents-including possible severe accidents-
because drivers might not have enough time to react to the sudden
loss of steering and bring their vehicles under control. To this end,
way material to this discussion. Citations to the Safety Act in this paper refer
to the pre-amended version.
30 15 U.S.C. § 1402(e)(2).
1United States v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
United States v. General Motors Corp., 65 F.R.D. 115 (D.D.C. 1974), appeal
pending, Civil Nos. 75-1751, 75-1752 (D.C. Cir.).
32 15 U.S.C. § 1391(1) (1972). Compare the language of the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Act, accompanying notes 9-14, supra.
31 United States v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 74-277 (D.D.C.). Cross-
motions for summary judgment were denied in a published opinion, 65 F.R.D. 115
(D.D.C. 1974). On April 25, 1975, the court issued an unpublished memorandum
opinion holding for the defendant, and on April 28, 1975, the court entered judg-
ment for the defendant. (Civil Nos. 74-277 and 74-1053 [D.D.C.]). The case is
currently on appeal. See note 1 supra.
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the Government identified several possible scenarios which could
lead to accidents.
In denying cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court
found that the pitman arms did contain a defect; they were in fact
prone to fatigue failure?' The court declined, however, to find that
an "unreasonable risk" existed on the basis of the abbreviated record
then before it. Stating that the question whether the defect posed
an "unreasonable risk" was "a matter of fact, not of supposition,"
the court ordered that a trial de novo be held on that issue.
The manufacturer adduced three basic types of evidence at trial:
historical data, engineering testimony, and risk analysis. The his-
torical data was introduced for the purpose of showing that no
injury-producing accidents were known to have occurred as a result
of pitman arm failure, even though the vehicles in question-which
were about fifteen years old-had already travelled an aggregate
of some twenty-four billion miles and had ninety-six percent of
their total service life behind them.
The engineering testimony centered on the well-known behavior
of fatigue cracks: Such fatigue cracks grow slowly (e.g., one
millionth of an inch per application of cyclic stress); for a fatigue
crack of a given size, there exists a well defined level of stress
that will cause the cracked part to fail completely; this critical
stress level decreases as the fatigue crack increases in size. In this
light, the manufacturer viewed the crucial fact in this case to be
that the stresses imposed on the pitman arm during maneuvers
below about ten miles per hour (particularly including parking
maneuvers) are twice as large as the stresses imposed on the arm
during higher-speed maneuvers. The manufacturer contended that
fatigue failure of the pitman arms should therefore occur only at
very slow speeds: Any fatigue crack that would have grown to a
size where it could fail completely under the relatively low loads
imposed by intermediate or high-speed driving maneuvers would
have failed earlier under the higher stresses imposed during a
previous low-speed maneuver (e.g., during the last preceeding park-
ing maneuver).
The manufacturer argued that the evidence just described shows
I United States v. General Motors Corp., 65 F.R.D. 115, 118 (D.D.C. 1974).
'AId. at 120.
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why the risk of accidents, deaths, or injuries associated with the
pitman arm defect should be small. At slow speeds, loss of steering
would not pose much of a hazard, because the driver should have
time to react, because the vehicle will not travel very far (if at all)
after the failure occurs, and because the vehicle will have less stored
energy (if any) available for release upon impact. These factors
would tend to explain the lack of any evidence that there had in
fact been injury-producing accidents resulting from pitman arm
failure. In an effort to put this intuitive result on a firmer footing,
the manufacturer offered in evidence a risk analysis using the
methods described in earlier sections of this paper.
In performing a risk analysis, one must have a body of data
sufficiently substantial and systematic to permit meaningful com-
parisons of risk levels to be made. The source of data used for the
manufacturer's risk analysis in the "pitman arm" case consisted
of official reports of motor vehicle accidents in the State of Texas
over a five-year period; those reports had been put on computer
tape and were available in a format that permitted convenient ac-
cess to the parameters of interest. Using a National Safety Council
classification system the Texas authorities had labelled the injury-
producing accidents as (i) fatal, (ii) non-fatal but incapacitating,
(iii) non-fatal and non-incapacitating, (iv) inconclusive, and (v)
no injury." The manufacturer matched these categories with the
severity categories used by the CPSC indicated in Table 1 in order
to permit the severity of each auto accident reported in Texas to be
numerically evaluated.'
Thus presented, the Texas accident data clearly reflected the
basic relationships between risk, severity, and frequency discussed
earlier in this paper. For example, Figure 1 shows that frequency
and severity are inversely related, not only for the accidents re-
ported to have resulted from vehicle defects (lower curve), but
also for all accidents reported, whatever the cause (upper curve).
The manufacturer also displayed the Texas data to show the
frequency-severity curves associated with accidents reportedly
caused by defects in different automotive components and systems.
"See NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, MANUAL ON CLASSIFICATION OF MOTOR VE-
HICLE TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (2d ed. 1970).
*7The manufacturer's correspondence between the National Safety Council
classifications and the CPSC severity values is shown in Table 2.
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Figure 2 shows that in each case the inverse relation between fre-
quency and severity still holds true-that is, more severe accidents
are less likely than no-injury or minor injury accidents. Where one
frequency-severity curve lies above another one, the higher curve
is associated with a greater risk than the lower curve, since for any
severity (or frequency) the higher curve has a higher frequency
(or severity). Thus, according to Figure 2, the risk associated with
defects in tires and brakes is greater than the risk associated with
the steering system.
Frequency - Severity for Automobile Accidents Caused
by Various Defective Vehicle Subsystems and Components
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The Texas data served as a background for the manufacturer's
quantitative estimates of risk. The manufacturer contended, based
on available historical data, that the pitman arm failure rate for
the fifteen years that the vehicles had been in service was ap-
proximately 0.15 percent per year amounting to a fifteen-year total
of approximately two percent. In addition, it was estimated from
historical data on motor vehicle attrition that the cars would re-
main in service approximately three additional years. On the basis
of these figures and the well known scatter in fatigue properties,
the manufacturer's analysis estimated that the average life of the
pitman arms (as opposed to the vehicles as a whole) would be
about forty-eight years, and that the failure rate of the arms would
not rise above its past value (0.15 percent per year) during the
remaining life of the vehicles."' Accordingly, the historical failure
rate for the past (0.15 percent per year) was used in the manu-
facturer's calculations of the risk associated with continued use of
the pitman arms in the future.
The fraction of pitman arm failures that are likely to involve
accidents was estimated by the manufacturer from available his-
torical data which indicated that two out of sixty-four reports of
pitman arm failure included allegations of resulting property dam-
age.' The manufacturer's analysis therefore assumed that during
the remainder of the service life of the vehicles approximately
38 Fatigue behavior in mechanical components is described by what is com-
monly called the "bathtub curve." This curve can be divided into three regions, as
shown in Figure 3. The first region (I) corresponds to early life; during this period
the failure rate may be relatively large due to the presence of design or manu-
facturing defects. Because defective parts fail early in life, the phenomenon is
often referred to as "infant mortality." The second region (II) corresponds to a
time after the defective parts have failed or have been removed from service.
The failure rate is fairly low during this period, which comprises most of the
life of the components; the failures that do occur during this period are the result
of abusive overloads or environmental conditions beyond the design spectrum of
the component. The third region (III) corresponds to long life, when the parts
simply begin to wear out due to such time-dependent degradation processes as
fatigue, corrosion, etc. Because of the scatter in material properties, this "wear
out" period occurs over an extended time period; it is, however, characterized by
a rapid rise in the failure rate over that in the second region.
If (as the manufacturer contended) the failure rate of the pitman arms would
not increase during the remaining expected service lifetime of the vehicles, then
the pitman arms would not experience the "wear out" region of the fatigue curve
(region III) while the vehicles are on the road. That is, the vehicles would wear
out before the pitman arms do.
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two out of every sixty-four pitman arm failures would result in
some kind of accident.
Having thus estimated the frequency of accidents caused by
failure of the pitman arms, the manufacturer then estimated the
distribution of the injury severities associated with the accidents.
Data compiled on the basis of direct experience with the pitman
arms was of limited usefulness, since no injuries were known to
have resulted from pitman arm failures. In an attempt to provide
a more conservative estimate than simply zero severity-which
would have resulted from using the historical pitman arm data
directly-the manufacturer used a severity spectrum derived from
the Texas injury data for all types of steering-defect related ac-
cidents.
These estimates for frequency and severity were then used to
calculate, employing the CPSC method already described, an esti-
mate for the risk (i.e., the CPSC frequency-severity index) assoc-
iated with failure of the pitman arms. That level of risk was com-
pared with the levels of other related risks calculated from the
19761
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Texas data. Using these methods, the manufacturer's analysis esti-
mated the risk associated with pitman arm failure in the vehicles
in question to be eight times smaller than the risk associated with
steering defect accidents generally; more than eight times smaller
than the risk associated with defects in tires, brakes, and lights; and
approximately 500 times smaller than the overall risk associated
with driving.' Moreover, the level of risk associated with pitman
arm failure was found to be roughly comparable with the apparent
variations in these other, larger risks.
TABLE III
Calculated Values of Frequency, f,
Mean Severity S and CPSC-Defined Total Severity I
For Several Vehicle Systems, Sub-Systems, and Components
f(l) S ="'
All Vehicles 6.65 X 10 197 1.3X 101
All Defective Vehicles 1.39 X 104 252 3.50X 101
Tires 2455 695 1.7X106
Other Defects 1341 509 6.82X 105
Brakes 7065 92 6.5 X 105
Lights 410 552 2.27X10 5
All Steering 587 280 1.64Xl05
Trailers 951 36 3.42X 104
Wheels Come Off 585 47 2 .75 X 104
Turn Signals 428 32 1.37X 104
Wipers 8 5 40
Pitman Arm Separations 8270 3.35 2.77X 104
Pitman Arm Separation That
Lead to Accidents 258 107 2.77X 104
(1) These values have been normalized to the total vehicle usage of 4.45X 106
vehicle years, in the State of Texas in CY 1971.
Based on these results, the risk analysis concluded that the level
of risk associated with pitman arm failure was so small as to be
"negligible"; that simply driving on the highway exposes people to
much larger risks; and that even the unavoidable variation in the
overall risk-resulting from the condition of one's own vehicle and
the surrounding vehicles, as well as from the conditions of traffic,
"' The results of these calculations are shown in Table 3.
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weather and visibility-is itself as large as, or larger than, the risk
associated with pitman arm failure.
The court received the manufacturer's risk analysis in evidence.
In its memorandum opinion, the court stated:
Risk analysis is based upon the premise, recognized by engineers,
that no event has zero probability and that no product can be
perfectly safe. [Failures of parts] are bound to occur. Risk analysis
attempts to put these failures in perspective, however, by quantify-
ing the safety record of an item (in this case, the pitman arm...)
so that it may be compared with other items, thereby determining
whether it presents an unreasonable risk to safety."1
The court then held that no "unreasonable risk" was shown to have
been present in the case.'
B. Risk Analysis As It Might Be Used in
an Aircraft Product Liability Case
The example of the pitman arm litigation shows how frequency
and severity accident data, together with engineering methods, were
used to evaluate the level of risk associated with a defect which
may cause failure of a system component. Risk analysis methods
may also be useful in another kind of case-in assessing whether
a component was in fact defective, where the part is not available
for study.
The following hypothetical situation is typical of this kind of
case. There has been an aircraft accident from which only a frac-
tion of the wreckage can be recoverd. Studies and examination
indicate that there is no malfunction or defect in the recovered
components. Litigation is nevertheless initiated, with the plaintiff
claiming that the accident was caused by failure of a component
that was not recovered. To strengthen his claim, the plaintiff relies
on FAA computer print-outs, which indicate that failures have
been reported in that component on other occasions. He also
establishes that the design of the part has recently been changed.
An expert in aircraft accident investigation testifies that failure of
the particular component could lead to a wreckage pattern, frac-
tures, metal deformations, paint smears, and other evidence similar
"' United States v. General Motors Corp., Civil Nos. 74-277 and 74-1053
(D.D.C., April 28, 1975).
4 As noted above, an appeal is currently pending from the trial court's judg-
ment. See note I supra.
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to that observed in this case. Thus the plaintiff's case is largely
circumstantial, resting on the fact that failure due to a defect in
the unrecovered part is consistent with the known facts, but lacking
any evidence that such failure in fact occurred, or (if it did occur)
that the failure caused the accident. In such litigation, the defense's
affirmative case is typically that the accident in question had some
other cause (operator error for example), the prior failures re-
ported by the FAA refer to prior models of the component, and
the component had been updated to accommodate design changes
in other portions of the system rather than because of some design
defect in the component itself. Attorneys for both sides focus on
the reported past failures with considerable debate over the dis-
closure of these failures to a jury.
One of the basic problems confronting the defense in such a
case is to emphasize the difference between establishing that an
event could possibly have occurred and that it actually or probably
occurred. Risk analysis concepts can be a useful tool in making
this distinction. By examining the frequency as well as the severity
of failure events, risk analysis can serve to separate the world of
the probable from the world of the merely possible.
In the hypothetical case just described, risk analysis concepts
and methods could be used to demonstrate that even if the type of
component inquestion had failed on other occasions, the mere fact
of such prior failures is, by itself, of little or no technical signifi-
cance. The absolute number of previous failures does not by itself
tell anything about the likelihood that such a failure occurred in
the case in question; rather, it is the failure rate that is significant-
the number of failures divided by the total number of such com-
ponents in service (or by some other quantity which relates to the
exposure of persons to the risk-for example the total number of
hours that all such components have been in service). For this
reason, "success data" as well as failure data must be considered;
if in determining whether a failure occurred in the present case
the finder of fact is allowed to consider evidence of ten prior failures
during the last five years, then the finder of fact should also be
allowed to consider evidence tending to show that the other 99,990
parts did not fail during their aggregate time of use throughout
that five years.
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In our hypothetical case, moreover, the use of risk analysis
methods can be facilitated and complemented by engineering
analyses. For example, if (as in the pitman arm case) it is either
established or conceded that there have been failures, a study of
the failure rates may be relevant to determining whether a defect
in design or manufacture is present. If' there is such a defect-
insufficient heat-treating, excessively sharp fillet radius, or insuf-
ficiently large cross-section as examples-some failure will occur
quite early in the design life of the part. If no such early failures
are present and prior failures have instead occurred around midway
through the design life of the part or later, it is improbable that a
generic defect is present; rather, the prior failures as well as the
failure in question were probably the result of other causes such
as improper maintenance, operator abuse, environmental conditions
exceeding design specifications, etc.'
Similarly, examination of failure rates may be useful in situa-
tions in which a change has been made in an allegedly defective
part, the plaintiff asserts that the change was a corrective measure
evidencing the defect and the defendant asserts that the change
was made for entirely different reasons. In such situations, the
failure rates before and after the change should be compared; if
both are low and relatively constant over time, then the original
part probably was not defective."
The use of frequency-severity concepts in a case of the kind
just discussed can be illustrated by an actual incident involving a
helicopter accident. The accident occurred when a control tube
failed and the pilot was unable to control the aircraft. Metallurgical
analysis indicated that the tube, shown 'schematically in Figure 4,
failed after localized internal corrosion had thinned the wall down
to the point where it could not support the service loads.
The local corrosion occurred near the lower bearing insert (or
"plug"). During manufacture, the tube is dipped into zinc chromate
43 See Figure 3 and the accompanying discussion in note 38 supra.
4If the original part had been defective, there would have been a high failure
rate early in its life ("infant mortality"). If the modified part were not defective,
its failure rate would be low. It is possible, of course, that the original part and
the modified part each contained a different defect. In such a case, however, it
would still be improbable for the two failure rates to be equal; while both would
be relatively high, they would most likely be different, reflecting different failure
mechanisms.
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solution to coat the steel surface and protect it from corrosion. The
steel plugs containing bearings are then dipped into zinc chromate
paste prior to being inserted and riveted into the tube. The paste
acts as a sealant, preventing moisture from getting into the tube.
The lower bearing insert is removed approximately every 2000
hours when the lower bearings are replaced. The service manual
requires that the tube then be checked for corrosion, cleaned, and
redipped in zinc chromate; zinc chromate paste must always be
applied to the newly inserted plug to seal the tube assembly. Follow-
ing the accident in question, the FAA asked operators for an
immediate corrosion check on all the control tubes, and MDR's
("Malfunction or Defect Reports") were compiled by the FAA.
These indicated that pitting, corrosion and rust had been found
in sixteen tubes, at service lives ranging from zero to 9000 hours.
There was no specific experience pattern associated with the re-
ports. The manufacturer subsequently issued a service bulletin
recommending that a different sealant be used instead of the zinc
chromate paste.
The plaintiff argued that the corrosion protection system was
proven to be inadequate by the facts that (1) the tube had failed
by corrosion, (2) other tubes were found to contain corrosion,
and (3) the manufacturer had recommended that the sealant be
changed. During discovery, however, it was determined that the
failed tube had been overhauled by the operator, and its lower
bearing insert replaced, 1640 hours before the accident. A detailed
metallographic study showed that zinc chromate was not present
on the lower tube or the lower plug. The defense argued that the
extensive corrosion on the lower plug and lower portion of the
tube resulted from improper maintenance; that zinc chromate had
not been applied to the tube or plug during the overhaul procedure
1640 hours before the accident; and that since the steel surface of
the tube was not protected, moisture was able to enter the tube
through the incomplete seal between tube and plug, condense on
the tube and plug, and thereby cause the localized corrosion that
ultimately led to failure.
Initially, the case would seem to involve the more customary
kind of expert metallurgical studies and testimony. But the basis
of plaintiff's case was the alleged existence of a design defect that
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allowed moisture to enter control tubes at the top and cause
interior corrosion, and frequency-severity concepts of risk analysis
can be used to assess the likelihood that plaintiff's theory is correct.
Each helicopter contains seven control tubes, and over the years
about 2000 such aircraft have flown an average of 6000 hours.
Assuming the lower bearing insert is replaced every 2000 hours,
the number of insert replacements is approximately 42,000.' If
there are sixteen reported observations of corrosion at the time
when the tubes are inspected, then the probability of having a
corroded tube is 1/900.' Based on an average of three replace-
ments per aircraft during its life, approximately forty-eight tubes
were estimated to have corroded over the twenty-five year service
period.' One corroded tube caused a failure-the failure in ques-
tion in the case.
The concept of "severity" is not limited to personal injuries or
to actual collision damage. Phenomena such as corrosion, rust and
cracking represent structural damage to materials, even though
often insignificant in degree, and thus can be characterized in terms
of a severity spectrum." Zero severity corresponds to no corrosion
or rust; low severity corresponds to fairly low, generalized corrosion
or rust (a thin layer coating the entire surface of the part but not
significantly decreasing the strength of the part); and high severity
corresponds to corrosion or rust over a localized area severe enough
significantly to reduce the strength of the part in that area, with a
consequently large probability of local failure.
Figure 5 is a frequency-severity plot of the corrosion in the
control tubes, with the vertical axis showing the frequency of cor-
roded parts and the horizontal axis showing the severity of cor-
rosion damage. The figure shows the inverse relationship of fre-
quency and severity characteristic of risk analyses. The numbers
This number is derived as follows:
(7 tubes / aircraft) X (2000 aircraft) X (6000 hours) --
(2000 hours per replacement) = 42,000 replacements.
48That is:
16 corroded tubes
(7 tubes/aircraft) x (2000 aircraft)
47 The three replacements come from 6000 hours of use per aircraft, divided
by 2000 hours of use per replacement. The forty-eight tubes come from three re-
placements over the life of the aircraft, times sixteen observations of corrosion.
48 Cf., Ang, supra note 7.
1976] RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
and the plot show that there is a low probability of corrosion per
part (1/900), and also a low historical probability of tube failure
(1/42,000) over the twenty-five-year service life. There is no evi-
dence of a relatively high failure rate early in the design life of
the parts, as one would expect to find if a defect were in fact
present. Thus the history of these control tubes does not appear
consistent with the theory that they contain a design defect or
other generic inadequacy. The excellent record of freedom from
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49 There was in fact no means of identifying the cause of the corrosion in the
sixteen corroded tubes previously reported. The reports (MDRs) did not indicate
any checks for zinc chromate, nor did they indicate whether the corrosion was
localized near the face of the lower plug, or whether it occurred throughout the
length of the tube. The absence of zinc chromate from the failed tube would have
indicated that the recommended corrosion protection system had not been used
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
that the system is a good one with some tolerance for environmental
degradation.
IV. TACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING
THE USE OF RISK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Risk analysis methods and concepts are being increasingly ap-
plied by agencies whose job it is to ensure that the public is pro-
tected against unacceptable risks. As already discussed, the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission uses risk analysis methodology
to evaluate the relative hazards posed by various consumer products
in order to establish priorities for corrective action. In addition,
risk analysis has been used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
in some extremely complex calculations to assess the level of risk
associated with the operation of nuclear power reactors." And the
application of risk analysis in numerous other contexts has been
suggested."
Nevertheless, risk analysis has just begun to be used in litigation;
the automotive case discussed above appears to be the first case
in which risk analysis methods were explicitly and directly used to
evaluate the level of risk associated with a specified type of event.'
Like any other litigation tool, however, risk analysis may pose
problems for counsel wishing to use it, particularly in light of its
current novelty.
and would have tended to indicate improper maintenance as the cause of the
failure.
O See the RASMUSSEN REPORT, supra note 22. The Report comprises a main
volume and 11 separate appendices in 8 volumes.
M" These have included the safety of commercially used drugs, cigarette smok-
ing and possible earthquake damage. See generally NAT'L ACADEMY OF ENGINEER-
ING, PERSPECTIVES ON BENEFIT-RISK DECISION MAKING (1972). See also Wall
Street Journal, Jan. 28, 1976, at 2, col. 2 (radiation from television sets).
" The underlying concepts of risk analysis appear quite clearly, although not
systematically, in the law of negligence. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 148-53 (3d ed. 1964). This fact suggests that risk analysis methodology
may, before long, come to play a role in negligence litigation. In addition, risk
analysis may be relevant and probative in some product liability cases. For exam-
ple, under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a seller of a de-
fective product may be strictly liable to users injured by the defect, but only if
the defect is one which makes the product 'unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer.' Risk analysis methods could be helpful to the finder of fact in deter-
mining whether a particular defect makes a product 'unreasonably dangerous,'
just as risk analysis was useful in the automobile recall case to determine whether
a particular defect posed an 'unreasonable risk' of accidents or injuries.
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Risk analysis methodology rests, at bottom, upon inferences from
experience; it attempts to compare the frequencies and severities of
various events. In order to present a risk case, a litigant must
present two types of evidence-first, evidence of what the fre-
quencies and severities are and, second, evidence of the inferences
that can be drawn from them. Both aspects of a risk analysis case
may present difficulties.
First, it may be difficult to present evidence of past experience
in a traditionally admissible form. Consider, for example, the data
concerning motor vehicle accidents in Texas that formed a basis
for the risk analysis testimony in the pitman arm case discussed
above. Those data came from accident reports filled out by Texas
police officers who, undoubtedly, in many cases arrived at the
scene of the accidents only after the accidents had occurred and
whose reports undoubtedly contained, in varying degrees, infor-
mation told to them by the drivers and other witnesses. Thus, if
the police officers who wrote the accident reports were to testify
to what took place, their testimony would be hearsay, at least in
part. If the officers' written reports, rather than their oral testimony,
were relied upon as evidence of what occurred, the hearsay nature
of the evidence would be compounded; and it would be further
compounded if reliance were placed upon summaries or characteri-
zations of the officers' reports prepared by Texas data processors
responsible for reducing the data in the reports to a more manage-
able form. In fact, the situation was even more problematical. The
Texas data used in the case were obtained from an independent
safety research organization, which had itself received the output
from the Texas data processors and had itself reprocessed the data
to put it into a format affording more convenient computer access."
Hearsay problems of this kind may be common in risk analysis
applications. The essence of a risk analysis study is a comparison
between the level of risk associated with the event or activity in
" In the pitman arm case, a witness from the safety research organization from
which the Texas data were obtained was offered to testify generally to how the
Texas data had been obtained and how such data were customarily used in safety
applications. This allowed the trial judge to assess how much weight to give the
Texas data generally, even though he could not directly examine the accuracy of
any particular report through witnesses with firsthand knowledge. On this basis,
the trial judge received the Texas data in evidence, despite its hearsay characteris-
tics.
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question and the levels of risk associated with other activities that
society does not regard as unacceptably risky. Evidence concerning
these latter activities-the "background" activities against which
the particular risks in question are to be measured-necessarily
will often be hearsay in nature if it is to be produced at all. For
instance, it is conceivable that, in an aviation case, the background
activity could be commercial aviation generally, and a party might
wish to produce evidence of the risk associated with commercial
aviation generally. Such data can be conveniently presented only
in hearsay form; there is obviously no practicable way to adduce
in court, through the testimony of witnesses having personal knowl-
edge, evidence of the frequency and severity of commercial aviation
accidents (and non-accidents) over the last several years.
Thus, a too strict adherence to traditional hearsay limitations
could effectively preclude the use of risk analysis in litigation con-
texts. Such a result seems unwarranted and unnecessary. So long
as the record contains a reasonable basis upon which the finder of
fact can meaningfully evaluate the reliability of the underlying data
concerning the background activity, the hearsay nature of the evi-
dence should not be regarded as disqualifying." Effective direct and
cross examination of the person sponsoring the data-for example,
the person responsible for collecting, processing, and publishing the
data-should sufficiently illuminate both the strengths and weak-
nesses of the data so that the risk analysis can be given whatever
weight it deserves," rather than simply being excluded by rigid
application of a prophylactic rule.
The problems posed by the hearsay nature of underlying evidence
"Hearsay problems have, of course, customarily been regarded as less trou-
bling in cases-such as the pitman arm case-where the finder of fact is a judge
rather than a jury.
" See note 53 supra. In other, similar contexts the courts have shown a willing-
ness to lift hearsay restrictions when not to do so would exclude from evidence
large data bases that are apparently reliable, the evidence is not otherwise avail-
able, and it is needed as the basis for expert testimony. For instance, evidence of
polls, surveys, or statistical studies have been found admissible over hearsay ob-
jections when the polls, surveys, or studies were shown to be relevant and appar-
ently reliable and the information could not practicably be presented any other
way. E.g., Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 479, 490 n.39 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 177 F. Supp. 1, 19 (N.D. Ill. 1959), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 366
U.S. 316 (1961); American Luggage Works v. United Trunk Co., 158 F. Supp.
50, 53 (D. Mass. 1957), afl'd, 259 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1958); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 35 F. Supp. 820, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). With regard
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needed for a risk analysis should be substantially alleviated by
Rule 703 of the recently adopted Federal Rules of Evidence, which
states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be ad-
missible in evidence. (emphasis added)"
Under this rule, the inquiry would not focus on whether data used
in performing a risk analysis constitutes hearsay, but would rather
(and properly) focus on whether the data is generally regarded by
persons working in the area of risk analysis as sufficiently reliable
to be used in that way.""
Aside from the hearsay problem, the nature of background risk
data may present other difficulties. The kind of data desired may
simply not be available or, if available, may be sketchy and sparse.
In the latter event, the reliability of the data base and the in-
ferences drawn from it may be open to question, even under Rule
703." i i I i
The prospect of having a data base less extensive than might be
desired highlights the fact that the use of risk analysis methods in
accident litigation rests, ultimately, upon informed engineering
judgment. In the final analysis, risk analysis testimony is opinion
testimony, to be offered by a qualified expert witness not only on
the basis of data which the finder of fact is in a reasonable position
specifically to computer-stored data, see, e.g., United States v. DeGeorgia, 420
F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969). And see generally Rule 803(24), F.R. Evid.
6 (Emphasis added.) The Federal Rules of Evidence were not in effect at
the time the pitman arm case was tried.
61 The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 703 states, among other things, that:
The rule also offers a more satisfactory basis for ruling upon the
admissibility of public opinion poll evidence. Attention is directed to
the validity of the techniques employed rather than to relatively
fruitless inquiries whether hearsay is involved. [Citation omitted.]
5 One might expect that, as a general matter, parts that fail frequently with
truly severe consequences will be recognized as unsafe, and litigation concerning
such parts either will not be reached or will be settled. Thus the cases in which
risk analysis might be expected to be most frequently invoked are those involving
relatively small numbers of failure events. The difficulties of estimating the risk
associated with infrequent failure events, when each failure has extremely severe
consequences, were described in the RASMUSSEN REPORT, supra note 22, Main
Volume at 12-13.
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to assess, but also on the basis of the details and dynamics of the
failure process in question."' If an attempt were made to bring (or
defend) a case based upon historical failure data alone, the case
would most likely be a weak one. Insight into the nature of the
failure process-whether it be chemical, metallurgical, biological-
is an indispensable guide to the proper use of historical data in a
risk analysis. Risk analysis may be used to supplement such in-
sight, to illuminate it from a different perspective, or to strengthen
it. Risk analysis, by itself, is not a substitute for the more traditional
kinds of expert studies of failure processes. Together with such
studies, however, risk analysis may provide a powerful tool for
putting the significance of failure processes in a more meaningful
perspective.
"' Under Rule 704 of the new Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert may
render an opinion on the ultimate issue in a case. Thus, had Rule 704 been in
effect at the time of the pitman arm trial, a risk analysis expert could have ren-
dered an opinion that the risk associated with the pitman arm was "reasonable"(or "unreasonable," if the witness were the Government's). Because Rule 704
was not in effect, the manufacturer's risk analysis expert gave as his opinion only
that the level of risk was so small as to be "negligible." It was then left to the
finder of fact to determine whether, on the basis of the entire record, the ex-
istence of an "unreasonable risk" had been established. A similar approach could
presumably be followed in those jurisdictions in which expert opinion testimony
on the ultimate issue is still not allowed.
